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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 2401 
KATE B. WILLIA.iv.LS, ET ALS., 
versus 
_JENNIE B. KNOWLES, ET .ALS. 
PETITION FOR APPEAL. 
To the Honorable Justices of the Suprenie Co·urt of .Appeals 
of Virginia_: 
Your petitioners, Kate B. Williams, Allie F. Baird, Daniel 
W. Baird, Marion B. Magee, Lillie May Baird and Lottie B. 
Snead, respectfully represent that they are agg-rieved by a 
final decree of the Hustings Court, Part II, of the City of 
Richmond, entered on the 19th day of August, 1940, in this 
cause, by which decree your petitioners were held to be en-
titled to only a l/14th interest each in the estate involved in 
this cause, instead of a 1/lOth interest th_erein. From said 
decree your petitioners pray an appeal. A transcript of the 
record of said proceedings is herewith presented and asked 
to be read as a part of this petition, from which the facts here-
inafter set forth and the errors complained of may be seen. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
This is a suit broug·l1t by the heirs at law of Bessie Gill for 
a partition of her real estate, all of which has recently been 
sold in these proceedings at the price of $15,000.00. 
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The intestate was an only child and she died in April, 1938, 
unmarried and without issue, and was predeceased by her 
parents as well as by her grandparents. , But heF .mother had 
a sister and a brother, and her father had a sister and two 
brothers, one of the brothers having died, unmarried and 
without issue, all the others having· predeceased the intestate, 
but leaving children. 
2* *On her paternal side her uncle, ,Joseph Horace Gill 
left two children, William P. Gill and Walter J. Gill. Her 
aunt, Emily Gill ~foC~nce, left a son, Henry M. l\foCance, 
who was survived by two children, Henry W. l\tic.Cance and 
Virginia L. McCance. 
On her maternal side the intestate 's aunt, Margaret Baird 
Jones, was survived by one daughter, Jennie B. Knowles; and 
her uncle, James S.' Baird, was s11rvived" by six cbildren, Kate 
B. Williams, Allie F. Baird~ Daniel W. Baird, Marion B. Ma-
g·ee, Lillie May Baird and Lottie B. Snead. 
It will be observed that the class of heirs nearest in degree 
of kin to the intestate at the· time of hei death is composed 
of ten first cousins, three on the paternal side and seven on 
the maternal side, all of whom are still living and parties to 
this suit, except Henry, M. ~fo9ance, ~l~~ ~~ft two sons. 
ASSIG1NMENT OF ERRJOR 
. The Court erred in entering the decree of August 19, 1940, 
wherein it was held that petitioners were entitled to· only a 
" 1114th interest each in the said estate, instead of a 1/lOth in-
terest each therein, and in c.onfirming. · the .Commissioner's 
scheme o'f distribution. and his interpretation placed upon sec-
tions 5264 ancl 5266 of the Code. 
ARGU~IENT. 
The question presented is one of. the co·nstruction of sec-
tions 5264 and 5266· of the ·Code~ Section 5264,. after ~tating 
the course of descent of title to the intestate 's property, pro-
vided: 
Fifth. If none such, then one moiety shall, go to the pa-
ternal, the other to the maternal kindred of the intestate, i.n 
the following comse : 
Six.th. First to the grandfather and grandmother or the 
survivor,. · . 
Seventh. If none, then to the uncles and aunts, and their 
descendants. 
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Section 5266 reads as follows : 
Whenever those entitled to partition are all in the same 
degree of kindred to the intestate, they shall take per capita 
or by persons; and where a part of them being dead and a 
part living, the issue of those dead have right to parti-
3* tion, such issue shall take *ver stirpes or by stocks, that 
is to say, the shares of their deceased parents. 
The Statute of Descents, now section 5264, has not been 
changed in any respect material to the question here pre-
sented, since it was first enacted in 1785 (12 Hennings Stat-
utes at Large, p. 138), and what is now section 5266 appeared 
in substantially the same language in the Code of 1785 a~ 
section 14, the same language coming down in the Code of 
1803 as section 16 ( 1 Rev. Code 1803, Ch. XCIII). In 1 Rey. 
Code of 1819, p. 355, the same language appears under sec-
tion 16. In the Code of 1849, p. 522, the same language iA in-
corporated under section 3, with this addition: '' but when-
ever those entitled to partition are all in the same degree of 
kindred to the intestate, they shall take per capita, or by per-
sons." In the ,Code of 1887, p. 619, the same language appears 
under section 2550. 
Section 5264 provided that one moiety of the estate '' shall 
go to the paternal, the other to the maternal kindred, of the 
intestate, in the following course: * * * to the uncles and 
aunts, and their descendants''. But this section is modified 
by section 5266, which, since the Code of 1849 has contained 
this all-inclusive languag·e: '' TfThenever those entitled to par-
tition are all in the same degree of kindred to the in.testate, 
they shall take per capita or by persons.'' 
According to the express terms of section 5266 the chil-
dren of the uncles and aunts, all of whom are in the same 
degree of kindred to the intestate (:first cousins), take per 
capita or by persons, and the two children of one of the de-
ceased first cousins take the share of their deceased parent. 
The principle underlying our Statute of Descents is that 
the nearest living kindred to tl1e intestate .should take his es-
tate, and where those who are to take the estate a re of equal 
degree of kindred to the intestate, it should be distributed 
equally among them. 
In Davis v. Rowe, 6 Rand. (27 Va.) 355, 365, after eom-
mentin~; on the Statute of Descents and the effect of section 
16 (now 5266), on the share to which each heir is entitled. the 
Court deducea this principle : 
4 * *'' That whenever several persons succeeded to the in-
heritance at the same time, if they are all related to the 
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intestate in equal degree, they shall take by persons; btit if 
part of .them be remote, those shall take the share of their 
deceased parent.'' 
This principle of e<.1uality shoultl be kept hi mind hi de-
termining· the co1istructio:il to be plat!ed upt>h tliti stathtes. It 
is obviotlS that the purpose of section 5266 is to preserve this 
equality throughout the variot1s subdivisibi1s of section 5264. 
The contention of appellees is that while section 5266 ap-
plies to all the subsections of section 5264 dbwn to '\Vhere 
the estate is divided into moieties between the paterrial arid 
maternal kindred, it does not apply to that particular sub-
division, arid that even thoug·h all of the uncles arid aunts are 
dead at the death of the intestate, the .division info nioieties 
must continue however unequal iilay be tlie distribution of 
the estate among the more reinote living tlescendants. 
It is respectfully submitted that the distdbution should be 
considered as of the titne of the death of the intestate, and 
where there are i10 living uricles ~nd aunts, as ih this . case; 
and the nearest livii1g heirs are first cousins, they should 
share equally in the estate; that is, take per capita. It should 
be bol'lle in niind that it is the estate of the intestate that is 
bei11:g distributed and nqt that of the unGlqs and aiints.. The 
fespective ino~eties me1itioned in the statute never trested in 
the 1h1cli3s and atli1ts, but thri ffrst cousins, and thefr descend-
ants, are heirs in their own right, direct ffofu the intestate. 
This being· the situation at the death of the intestate, section 
5266 applies a:hd determines the pi·dpdttiotis iii ~wlifo11 they 
shall take. 
While there arc rid decisio1is in this State dea~irig ,vith tlie 
applicability· of s~ctiort 5266 to facts pi·ecisely like tliose iit 
the instant case, the principle here iiivblved was settled in 
the well cdJisiµered case of Davis v. Rowe, sitiJrtt . . iii tliaf. 
case the intestate had had one brotlfor, and one sister, but. 
botH of tlietri died before hini. The cdriiplaimint ,vas the 
5* only child and heir of the brothei·. *The ~ste1; left foµr 
· children, two of ,vliom were living and two dead at th<? 
death of the iritestate, but. one left hvo childN~ti and the othe'i-
s1x. The complainatit claimed tllat the ~state sbouia lie di:. 
vided into moieties; that she, as representing· :lier father; thP 
deceased brother of the intestate, was entitled to bric 1tibie~y, 
and that the othei; _moiety should be diyidetl into fotir patts. 
The cottH held that section 16 (rtow 5266) eiribtabed the case 
urider ctinsid<fratioil and that the· estate shohld be divided into 
five portions. corresponding to tlte five living descendants ·in 
the nearest degree of kindred to the intestate. 
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The 4th section of the Statute of Descents at the time of 
the decision in Dav-is v. Rowe, provided as follows: ''To his 
mother, brother and sisters, and their descendants, or such 
of them as there be. * ... • . '' Here the statute gives the 
mother and each brother and sister a specific portion of the 
estate, but the court ignored these specific portions when all 
of the individuals entitled thereto were dead, and took the 
nearest living descendants as the root from which to begin 
the division. 
Section 5264 gives one moiety of the property involved iu 
this suit to the uncles and aunts on the paternal side, and 
their descendants, and the other moiety to the uncles and 
aunts on the maternal side, and their descendants. In both 
of these cases the property is given to certain individuals and 
their descendants, and when all of those individuals are dead 
it is immaterial whether part are on the side of one parent 
or the other, and the same rule should be. applied in the in-
stant case as was invoked in Davis v. Rowe. In that case 
the court held that our statutes had abolished the common 
law principles of descent and established as a basis for the 
Statute of Descents the principles of the civil law, the g·reat 
object' of which is said to be ''equality". 
In Davis v. Rowe, Judge Carr, speaking for the court, said: 
'' .As to the persons or classes of persons that are to in-
herit, it is acknowledged, that the act is· so clear and com-
prehensive, as to render improper a reference to any other 
system. And to my apprehension, it seems to be *equally 
6" comprehensive as to the proportions, in which the per-
sons or classes desig·nated, are to take. As to this last. 
this act laye down two rules; within one or other of whicb~ 
every case must fall. They are contained in the first and six-
teenth sections. 1st. The estate shall des·cend to the kindred, 
male and fema;le, of the -intestate, in parcenary; that is, in 
eq'Ual shares. The clear effect of this is, that whenever a cla.r;s 
is called to the inheritance to,gethe-r, they take equally, malP 
and female. Thus, 'to his children, or their descendants, in 
equal shares. To his mother, brothers and sisters, and thefr 
descendants, in equal shares. To his grandmother, uncles 
and aunts, and their descendants, in equal shares;' and so 
on, in the grades more remote. Thus is one gTeat principlP 
of the act ( equality) established. But there is another fea-
ture equally striking throughout this excellent statute. It i~ 
founded on the affections of the heart: It follows the cur-
rent in its natural flow, presuming that those that are nea1> 
est in blood are nearest in affection. Thus, it is first to his 
children, or their descendants, next to his father, then to his 
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mother, brothers and sisters, &c., always exhausting the 
nearer class before it passes to the more remote. But, in the 
same class, there are degrees of propinquity and remoteness; 
as · the descendants of children, of brothers and sisters, of 
uncles and aunts, &c., are more remote than their roots. And 
while the statute did not mean to exclude any of these re~ 
moter branches of a class called to the inheritance, the same 
principles of natural affection prescribed, that those of the 
class, who were nearest the intestate, should have the larg-
est portions; and to effectuate this object, to settle these pro-
portions among the different branches of the same class ( and 
solely for this end, as it seems to me), the statute has called 
to its aid the jus revresentationas, a rule common to the 
civil and common law, though of different extent in the two 
Codes. Thus (by section 16), 'When children of the intes-
tate come into partition, they shall take per capita; that is 
to say, by persons; and where a part of them being· dead and 
a part living, the issue of those dead have right to partition, 
such issue shall take per stirpes, or by stocks; that is to say, 
ihe share of their deceased parent'. So of mothers, brothers 
and sisters, grandmothers, uncles and aunts, and the i:emotet· 
classes, each in its turn * * • . " 
Observe that the court said: "Whenever a class is called 
to the inheritance together they take equally.'' In order to 
preserve this principle of equality it was necessary in that 
case for the court to construe section 16 (now 5266) as ap-
plying· to the persons who should take, by implication. :The 
statute at that time did not expressly apply to brothers and 
sisters and their descendants; it provided that "When chil-
dren of t.he deceased come into partition, they shall take per 
capita'', etc. 
The present section ( 5266) is clear and comprel1e11sive. 
It expressly applies to every subsection under section 5264. 
It says that "Whenever those entitled to partition are all in 
the same degree of kindred to the intestate, they shal1 
7* take per ca.pita". To *limit by const.ruction the operation 
of this section would be to destroy the great principle 
upon which the Statute of Descents is based-equality among 
remote heirs who are in the same degree of kindred to tl1e 
intestate. 
This petition and the transcript of the record accompany-
ing it will be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of 
Appeals at Richmond . 
. A COl)Y of this petition was delivered to the opposing coun-
sel in the trial court on the 25 day of November, '1940. 
Kate B. Williams, et als., y. Jennie B. Knowles, et als. 7. 
CONCLUSION. 
For these and other errors apparent upon the record, your 
petitioners pray that an appeal to the decree complained of 
be granted them; that said decree be reyiewed and reversed, 
that your petitioners may be adjudicated to be entitled to a 
one-tenth interest each in said estate, and that they may 
have such other, further and general relief in the premises 
as the nature of their case may require or to equity shall 
seem meet. 
THOS. I. TALLEY, 
KATE B. WILLIAMS, 
ALLIE F. BAIRD, 
DANIEL W. BAIRD, 
:M:ARION B. MAGEE, 
LILLIE MAY BAIRD, 
LOTTIE B. SNEAD, 
By Counsel. 
412 Travelers Bldg., 
Richmond, Va., 
DONALD D. WILLIAMS, 
Attorneys for Petitioners. 
I, Thos. I. Talley, an Attorney at Law practicing in the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, do certify that, in 
my opinion, the decree complained· of in the foregoing· peti-
tfon should be reviewed by the Supreme Court of Appeals. 
THOS. I. TALLEY, 
412 Travelers Bldg., 
Richmond, Va. 
Copy of the above petition received this 25th day of Nov., 
1940. 
GEO. E. ALLEN, 
Atty. for Henry W. l\foCance and Virginia 
· Lee McCance and all others similarly 
situated who, etc. 
Received November 27, 1940. 
M. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT QF APPE'AL~ 0~: VIB:GI~IA.~ 
1' 
KATE B. WILLIA~IS,_ ~·T· ALS.,: 
V(}'r.$'ltS. 
tTENNIE B. KNOWLES, ET· ALS. · 
.AJN.SW·ER OF DEF'EJNDANTS IN COURT BELOW T,O 
PETITION OF KATE B. WILLIAMS AND 
OTHERS IDOR AN APPEAL. , 
QUESTJON ]NVDLVE:~. 
The sole question. for determination is the tr.ue construc-
tion of Sootions 5264 and 5266 of the Code of. Virginia, pro-
viding· for the course of descents in this state, and prescrib-
ing the mode of distribution of estates of persons dying in-
testate. 
BRIEF STATEMENT. OF F-.ACT.S. 
Be~sie Gill, of full ag·e, died intestate, without issue, and 
unmarried, seized and possessed of a considerable real and 
personal estate, leaving the following relations· only: (a) oii 
the mother's side, six first cousins, one, the child of a de-
ceased aunt, and the other five, cllildren of a deceased uncle; 
and (b) on the father's side, two first cousins, the children 
of a deceased uncle, and two second cousins, the children of 
the son of a deceased aunt. 
2* *DISPOSITION Olt, THE CASE IN T·HE OOURT 
. BELOW. 
The trial court, following Section 5264 of the Code of Vir-
ginia, di~ecting the course of. descents, ordered that the es-
tate of the intestate be divided into moieties in accordance 
wit4 the fifth paragraph of that section, the deceased hav-
ing left none of the relatives mentioned in the first. second, 
third, and fourth paragTaphs of· the se~tion, and directed 
that one moiety be divided l)etween the relations ·on the 
father's side and the other, between the relations on the 
mother's side. Section 5266 of the Code prescribin_q the mode 
of distribution was then applied in the distribution of each 
moiety. In other words, the half wl1ich was allotted to the 
relations on the mother's side was distributed among those re-
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lations in accordance with the provisions of Seetion 5266 of 
the Code and likewise the one-half which was allotted to the 
relations on the father's side was distributed among such re-
lations in accordance with the provisions of the same sec-
tion. : 
CONTENTIQNS OF THE PARTIES. 
It is the contention of the petitioners that the estate should 
not have been divided into moieties, but that the provisions 
of Section 5266 of the Code should have been applied to th~ 
estate as a whole, just as if all of the relations had been Qll 
one side. It is the contention of the respondents that Sectioii 
5264, declaring· the course of descents, was mandatory upon, 
the court and that Section 5266, merely prescribing the 
3* mode of distribution, could *not be applied until aft~1~ 
the provision of Section 5264 had been applied and the 
estate divided into moieties; and that after the awarding of 
one moiety to the paternal kindred and the other moiety to 
the maternal kindred, the two moieties should be dealt with 
as separate and distinct estates. 
ARGUMENT. 
The sections of the Code referred to read as follows: 
"Sec. 5264. Course of descents generally.--.When any per-
son having title to any real estate of inheritance shall die in-
testate as to such estate, it shall descend and pass in par-
cenary to such of his kind red, ma.le and female, as are not 
alien enemies, in the following course: 
'' First. To his children and their descendants. 
"Second. If there be no child, nor the descendant of any 
child, then to bis or her father and mother, or the survivor. 
"Third. If there be neither father nor mother, then to his 
or her brothers and sisters, and their descendants. 
"Fourth. If none such, then the whole shall go to the sur-
viving consort of the intestate. .. 
' ' Fifth. If none such, then one moiety shall go to the pa-
ternal, the other to the maternal kindred, of the intestate, 
in the following course: • 
'' Sixth. First to the g-randf ather and gTandmother, or the 
survivor. 
'' Seventh. If none, then to the uncles and aunts, and their 
descendants. · , 
''Eighth. If none such, then to the p:rea.t ~randfatbe1·R or 
great grandfather, and great grandmothers, or great grand .. 
mother. 
'' Ninth. If none then to the brothers and sisters of the 
grandfathers and grandmothers, and their descendants. 
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"Tenth. And so one (on), in other cases, without end, 
passing to the nearest lineal ancestors, and the *descend-
4 * ants of such ancestors. 
'' Eleventh. If there be no paternal kindred the whole 
shall go to the maternal kindred; and if there be no maternal 
kindred, the whole shall go to the paternal kindred. If there 
be neither maternal nor paternal kindred, the whole shall go 
to the kindred of the husband or wife, in the like course as 
if such husband or wife had died entitled to the estate." 
'~ Sec. 5266. When parties take per capita, and when per 
stirpes.-Whenever those entitled to partition are all in the 
same degree of kindred to the intestate, they shall take per 
capita or by persons; and where a part of them being· dead 
and a part living, the issue of those dead have right to par-
tition, such issue shall take per stirpes or by stocks, that is 
to say, the shares of their deceased parents.'' 
It will be observed that .Section 5264 declares the coursP 
of descents, and provides that when a person dies intestate 
leaving no children or descendants of any; no father or 
mother, no brothers, sisters, or descendants of any, no con-
sort, "then one moiety shall go to the paternal and the other 
to the maternal kindred of the intestate.'' 
As stated by 1\f r. tT ustice Epes in Copenhaver v. Pendleton,. 
1.55 Va. 463, 155 S. E. 802 : 
I 
''It has been repeatcclly held in Virginia that the statute 
of descents of 1785 wholly abrogated the common-law rule of 
primogeniture, the canons of descent, and the rule that no one 
could be a stirps from wliom descent could be derived unless 
he was actually seised or was the last purchaser, i. e., the 
whole of the common law regulating descents, and substi-
tuted therefor an entirely new system applicable to every 
possible case which can happen, which system is g·overned by 
new analogies. 2 Minor on Real Prop. (2d Ed.), Sec. 920~ 
pp. 1171, 1172; Broume v. Tu,rberv·illc, 2 Call. (6 Va.) 390: 
Templeman v. Steptoe, 1 1\fonf. (15 Va.) 339; Daiiis v. Rowe, 
6 Rand. G27 Va.) 355 ; lJf cdley v. llfodley, 81 Va. 265." 
.5* *It is submitted that, upon the death of the intestatP. 
title to one-half of her estate immediatelv vested in thP 
paternal kindred and the other half in the maternal kindred, 
by the express terms of Section 5264 of the Code. Therefore, 
'' those entitled to partition'' within the contemplation of Sec-
tion 5266 of the Code, are those who are entitled to partition 
· of the respective moieties. In other words, the maternal kin-
dred arc entitled to partition of that moiety which descended 
to them under Section 5264, and likewise the paternal kin-
eked are entitled to the moiety which descended to them, and 
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the lear~e~ Judg·e of _the lower court was right in applying 
the prov1s10ns of Section 52,66 to each moiety separately. 
We think this question is put at rest by the Virginia case 
of Browne .v. T·u.rberville, 2 Uall. 390 (fi Va.). In that case 
George Waugh died intestate, without issue and unmarried, 
leaving an uncle and three cousins, children of a deceased 
uncle of the whole blood on the mother's side, and an uncle 
of the half blood, likewise on the mother's side, and leaving, 
also, two relatives on the father's side. The estate of the 
decedent was ordered, by the Hig·h 'Court of Chancery, to bo 
divided into two moieties, of which one was to he divided be-
tween the two relations on the father's side and the other 
moiety was to be divided between those on the mother's side, 
as follows: two-fifths to the uncle of the whole blood, two-
fifths to the three cousins, and one-fifth to the uncle of th{) 
half blood. The Court of Appeals, in opinions by Fleming, 
Carrington, Lyons and Pendleton, affirmed the decreP 
' 6* *of the High Court of Chancery.· Judge Pendleton was 
one of the framers of the statute declaring the course of 
descents generally and his construction and application of 
the statute is worthy of the greatest consideration. B-rowne 
v. Tu.rberville was cit~d with approval in Co17enhave1r v. Pen-
dleton, supra. 
In Coz.zens v. ,Joslvn, 1 Rhode Island 122, where a similar 
statute was before the court, it was said: 
"It was also show,1 and admitted to this .court, that the 
said Elizabeth,. at the time of her decease, left no child, 1101· 
father nor mother, nor sister nor brother, nor descendants 
of either~ 
'' In such a case the $tatute is express, that the intestate 
estate 'shall go in equal moieties to the paternal and ma-
ternal kindred'. It gives no preference to one line over .the 
other, an.cl there is no reason why it should do so. Each 
moiety is to he distributed as a distinct estate and 'to go 
first, to the grandfather. If there be no grandfather, then 
to the grandmother, uncles and aunts on the same side, and 
their descendants or such of them as there be'. As the statute 
also provides that 'the descendants of any person deceased 
shall inherit the estate which such person would have in-
herited had such person survived the intestate', all the de-
scendants of any deceased uncle or aunt, living at the de-
cease of the intestate, succeed by representation to the por-
t.ion to which such uncle or aunt would have been entitled had 
he outlived the intestate. 
'' Another provision of the statute of descents is, that when 
'the inheritance is directed to go by moieties to the paternal 
and maternal kindred, if there be no such kindred on the one 
' I:. 
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part, the whole shall go to the other part'. So long as there 
is any-·kindred, however re~ote, on the part of the paternal 
line, the·y take one moiety ·9f the estate. The inheritance, 
after onc-e divided, cannot be' again united and descend in one 
line, until there ceases to be a representative of. that other 
line.'' :: 
A similar statute was before the court in McKinney v. Ab-
bott, 49 Texas 371:' Chief Justice Roberts, rendering the opin-
ion of the court, said: 
T"' *"W. L. McKinney died in Grayson County in 1877, 
leaving lands in the State of Texas, and the matter in 
dispute is who are entitled, under the laws of this State at 
said date, to inherit them. He had neither wife, children, 
father, mother, brothers, sisters nor descendants of either, 
nor grandparents or great-grandparents, maternal or pa-
ternal, living at the time of his death. 
'' AppeJlees, Abbott and others, plaintiffs in this suit, arc> 
descendants of the paternal grandfather and g·randmother. 
There· are no descendants of the maternal grandfather 01· 
grandmother. But appellants, D. Y. McKinney and others. 
defendants in this suit, are descendants of the maternal great 
grandfather and great ·grandmother. 
"The question which it is the object of this suit to try, is-
Must the real estate left by William L. McKinney be divided 
into two equal moieties or portions and one of them be given 
to the descendants of his grandfather and grandmother, by 
the- father's side, and the other portion be given to the de-
scendants of his great-grandfather and great-grandmother. 
on his mother's side? We are of opinion that it must. This 
opinion is based upon a construction of the fourth subdivision 
of section 2 of the ,act 'to regulate the descent and distribu-
tion of int.est.ate 's estate' ( Paschal 's Dig.~ Art. 3419), in con-
nection with other parts of that law, and of other previous 
laws, of which that one is an amendment ancl revision. 
"Said act, in the event there is no wife, cl1ildren, father. 
mother, brothers, sisters, or the descendants of either of 
them, provides that 't.J1e inheritance shall be -divided into two 
moieties, one of which shall go to the paternal and t]1e otbe"J' 
to the maternal kindred in the following course, that is to say: 
To the p:randfather and g-ra.ndmother in eoual portions; bu1 
if only one of these be living·, then the estate shall be divided 
into two eaual parts, one of which sl1all go to such snrvivor, 
and the other shall !l'O to the descendant or descendants of 
such deceased g-randfather or ~randmother. If there be no 
i:;uch descendants, then the whole estate shall be inherited by 
the surviving grandfather or grandmother. If there be no 
such surviving gTandfather or grandmother, then the whole 
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~f such estate shall go to the descendants, or such of them 
as there be, and so on without end, passing in like mannet 
to the nearest lineal ancestors and their descehq.ants, or to 
such of them as· there be·'. (PaschaPs Dig., Art 3419.) 
·· "'The obscurity and uncertainty o'f "this subdivision of 
8* said section arise out of the fact, that *after the in.: 
, heritance· is directed to be divided into two moieties, one 
to go to the paternal and the other to the maternal kindred 
of the intestate, the statute in that section makes no further 
reference to the two estates thus created out of the inherit-
, ailce, but proceeds to state how the estate, as if there were 
but one, shall descend and be inherited, concluding with the 
direction that it shall go to the 'nearest lineal ancestors, or 
their descendants, or to such of them as there be'. 
· '' If this had been said to be the· course of each one of the 
two ·estates, niade by dividing the inheritance into two moie-
ties, it would have ·been more· plain as to what was meant. 
Still, it is more reasonable that· s·rich was its meaning, tlian 
that there should be no division of the inheritance when the 
kindred happened to be nearer Qn one side than on the other, 
which, it must have been know:Q, would very often happen. 
' 'This section in the act of 1848 is the same as the third, 
fourth, fifth and sixth sections of the act of 1840 on the same 
subject, and in that act there was another section, which 
fully explains what was meant. It is the tenth ,section, a~ 
follows: '"\Vliere, for the want of issue of the intestate, and 
of father, mother, brothers and sisters, or their descendants, 
the inheritance is directed to go by moieties to the paternal 
and maternal kindred, if· there should be no such kindred 011 
the one part, the whole shall go to the other part; and if ther~ 
be no kindred on the one part or the othe1·, the whole shall 
go to the wife or husband of t.lie intestate,' &c. (Hart. Dig., 
Art. 581, p. 21 7.) 
"We have here, incidentally, an explanation of what was 
meant in the fourth subdivision of the section of the statute 
under consideration, as it stood in the act of 1840, the lead-
ing object of which, doubtless, was to cast the inheritancr 
upon the wife or husband· upon a certain remote contingency, 
and, as we may presume, this tenth section in the act of 1840 
was entirely omitted in the act of 1848, because in the latter 
act an entirely different and more beneficial provision was 
made for the descent· of the inheritance upon the wife or hus-
band. (Paschal's Di@:., Art. 3422:) 
''With' the explanation thus furnished by the said tentl1 
section, there could be no doubt but ·that, in the conting·eucy 
contemplated by this fourth subdivision~ the moieties of th0 
inheritance should g·o to the paternal and ·ma.ternal kindred 
respectively, although the kindred of one side might be more 
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remote than those upon the other, so long as any such ex-
isted to take the moiety allotted to each side. That being the 
meaning of this provision as it stood in the act of 1840, if 
9* should be '*held to mean the same thing in the act of 1848~ 
now in force, although the explanation of it, incidentally, 
made by said tenth section, has been omitted in the said act 
of 1848. '' 
Estes v. Nicholson, 23 Southern 490 (Supreme ·Court of 
Florida),. expressly . follows the Virginia case of Browne v. 
Ti1,rberville. Chief Justice Taylor, delivering the opinion 
of t1:te court, said: 
''.Section 1820 of our Revised Statutes provides as follows: 
'Whenever any person having· title to real estate of inherit-
ance shall die intestate as to such estate, it shall descend 
in parcenary to the male and female kindred in the follow-
ing course, that is to say: To the children or their descend-
. ants and the husband, if the decedent be a married woman 
and the husband survive her. If there be no children or 
their descendants, and the decedent be a married woman 
and her husband survive her, all the property, real and per-
sonal, shall go to the husband; and if there be no children 
or their descendants, and the decedent be a married man and 
his wife survive him, all his property, real and personal, shal1 
go to the wife. If there be no children, and 110 husband or 
wife, then to the father. If there be no father, then to the 
mother, brothers and sisters and their desc<;mdants, or sucl1 
of them as there may be. If there be no brother, nor sister, 
nor their descendants, the inheritance shall he divided intt) 
moieties, one of which shall go to the paternal, and the other 
to the maternal kindred in the following course, viz.: First 
to the grandfather. If there be no grandfather, then to the 
g·randmother, uncles and aunts on the same side or their 
descendants, or such of them as there be. If there he no 
grandmother, uncle or aunt, nor their descendants, then to 
the great-grandfathers, or great-grandfather if there be but 
one. If there be no great-grandfather, then to the great-
grandmothers, or great-gTandmother, if there ·be but one, and 
brothers and sist~rs of the grandfathers and grandmother~ 
and their descendants, or sueh of them as there be. And so 
in other cases without end, passing to the nearest lineal male 
ancestors and for the want of them to 'the lineal female an-
cestors,. in the same degree and the descendants of such male 
and female ancestors, or to such of them as there may be.' 
'' Section 1823 of the Revised Statutes, upon which the 
court below evidently predicated its degree of adjustment be-
tween the parties, provides as follows : 'In the cases· before 
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mentioned, where the inheritance is •directed to pass 
10* to the ascending and collateral kindred of the in-
testate if part of such collaterals be of the whole 
blood to the intestate, and one part of the half blood 
only, those of the half blood shall inherit only half as much 
as those of the whole blood, but if all be of the half blood, 
they shall haye whole portions, only giving to the ascendants 
( if any there be) double portions.' · 
"'llhe court below erred in its construction of the statute. 
The provision therein, to the effect that if there be neither 
husband or wife, nor children, or their descendants, nor father 
or mother, nor brother or sister, or their descendants, the in-
heritance shall be divided into moieties, one of which shall 
go to the paternal, and the other to the maternal, kindred, 
is imperative, and creates, under circumstances intended to 
be met thereby, practically two distinct estates, the oue fall-
ing to the paternal kindred, the other to the maternal; and 
the directions following this provision are designated to give 
the course that each of the two moieties shall separately take 
after the division into moieties. The inheritance, after once 
being divided into moieties, cannot be again united, and de-
scend in one line, until there ceases to be a representative of 
the other line. So long as there are any kindred, however 
remote, on the one side or the other, he, she, or they take 
one of the moieties, to the exclusion of the kindred on the 
other side, who are entitled to the other. Ooz.zens v. Joslitn, 
1 R. I. 122; Heirs v. Barrett's Heir.i;, 30 Tex. 637; Brown v • 
. 'furberville, 2 Call 390." 
In the case of Moore v. Conner, 2 Va. Decisions 56, 20 S. E. 
936, the court, after quoting the statute, said: 
'' Thus two general courses of descent are provided, first 
commencing with the children of the intestate and their de-
scendants, and ending with his mother, brothers and sisters 
and their descendants ; and t11e second, beginning with the 
grandchildren and ending with the husband or wife and his 
or her kindred.'' 
It appears from 1Vells' Heirs v. Head, 51 Ky. 166, that Ken-
tucky adopted the Virginia statute about 1797 and in con-
struing· the statute, the court said, among other thing·s: 
''For want of mother, brothers, sisters and their descend-
ants, the estate descends in equal moieties to the paternal 
and maternal kindred." 
11 * *Witherspoon v. Jerni_qan., et al., 76 S. W. 445 (Su-
preme Court of Texas), is directly in point. The syl-
labus is as follows: 
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'' 1. Rev . .St. 1895, art. 1688, subd. 4, relative to descent of 
intestate estates, enacts that, if there be no childreµ, father 
or mother, or husband or wife, the inheritance shall be di-
vided into two moieties, one of which shall go to the paternal 
and the other to the maternal kindred, and that, if there be 
no surviving grandfather or grandmother, 'the whole estate 
shall go to their descendants, and so on without end, passing 
iri like manner to the nearest lineal ancestors and their de-
scendants'. Held that, where an estate came within the terms 
of subdivision 4, it should be divided into two equal parts, 
each of whieh, for the purposes of distribution, became a 
separate estate. · 
"2. Article 1695, on the same subject, provides that when 
the intestate's children, or brothers and sisters, uncles and 
aunts, OF any other relations of the deceased standing in the 
'first and ·'same degree' alone come into the partition, they 
shall take per capita, and when, a part of them being dead 
and a part living, the descendants of those dead have right 
to partition, such descendants shall inherit such portion as 
the parent through whom they inherit would be entitled to. 
if alive. Held, that the intention of article 1695 was that when 
other relations standing in the first 'or' same degree alone 
came into partition tl1ey should take per ca.pita, and where 
intestates' only heirs were aunts and their descendants on 
the maternal side, and on the paternal side were first cousins 
and children of deceased first cousins, such children were en-
titled to the shares of their deceased parents.'' 
It will be observed that the court held that the estate should 
be divided into two equal parts, each of which, for purposes · 
of distribution, became a separate estate. 
OONCLUSION. 
It is respectfully submitted that in view of the express pro-
visions of the Virg-inia statutes, and the authorities con-
12* struing *them and similar statutes in other states, the 
decree of the learned trial court was right, and that the 
petition for the appeal should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted. 
GEO. E. ALLEN, 
· Counsel for Defendants. 
November 27th, 1940. 
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REcoilo 
VIRGINIA: 
Pleas befpr.e the ~onorable ·wmis D.~ .Miller, Judge of 
the Law and Equity Court ,of tl;ie City of Richmond, sitting 
f.or and at the request oJ the Honorable Willis C. Pulliam, 
J ~dge .of the . s·aid Itu~tings Court, .P~rt U;. held for the 
said C~ty at, the Oo~rt;roqm thereof m the Courthouse 
thereof at Tenth and Hull Streets, in. the City of Rich-
mond, on the 11th day of September, 1940~ 
Be It Remembered, that heretofore.; to;..wit: .A..t. the Rules 
held in the Clerk's Office of the said, Hustings Court, Part 
II, of the City of Richmond at the First. Marc.Ji Rti\es 1940 
(being the l~i;;.t Monqay in Febr~a~y, 1J~40) ; Ca,m.e Kate B. 
Williams, Allie F.· Bair~,. D~niel W ... B0iird ahd Marion B. 
Magee, by counsel, and filed their Bill of, .Oomp}ai.nt _agaiiist 
Jenni~. B. I(p.owles, _Walter J~. Gill, W.illi~m _ P. Gill, .Lillie 
May Baird, Lottie B. Snead, Hen1'y W. M<;!,Qance, and Vi r-
ginia L. McCauce, the last named def ~nda~t. being an infant 
under the age of twenty-one years, wµic~ Bill of Cotnplairit 
is, in part, in the following words and figures~· to-wit: 
page 2 ~ Virg·inia : 
In the Hustings C'ourt, Part Two; of the dity of Richmond. 
Kate B. ·wmiams, Allie F. Baird, Daniel W. Baird and Marion 
B. Magee; Complainants, 
v. . . . . . . . 
Jennie B. Knowles, Walter tJ. Gill, William P. Gill; Lillie May 
Baird, Lottie B. Snead, Henry:W .. McCance, and Virginia 
L. ~{cCance, the last named clefendfl.n.t b~ing an infant nn-
der the age of twenty-one years; Defendants. 
BILL OF co1vn:1tArNT. 
To the Honorable Willis 0. Pulliam, tTudge: 
Your complainants. T{ate B. William~, Allie F. Baird, 
Daniel W. Baird and Marion B._ Magee, respMtfttlly show 
unto vour Honor the following facts: 
1. That Bessie Gill during- her tf etime resided in the City 
of Richmond, Virginia, and died unmarried, intestate and 
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without issue, on the . . . . . . day of April, 1938, and was not 
survived by either of her parents, or by any brothers or sis-
ters or their descendants, or by her grandfather or grand-
mother, but left as her next of kin and only heirs at law the 
following named persons : 
Jennie B. Knowles, the only child of Margaret Baird Jones, 
. · who was the only sister of Charlotte Baird Gill, 
the mother of said Bessie Gill, the said Mar-
garet Baird Jones and Charlotte Baird Gill as 
well as their husbands having· predeceased the 
said Bessie Gill. 
Lillie May Baird, 
Lottie Snead, 
page 3 ~ Kate B. Williams, 
Daniel W. Baird, 
Marion B. Magee, and 
.Allie F. Baird, the only children of James S. Baird, who was 
the only brother of said Charlotte Baird. Gill. 
William P. Gill, and 
Walter J. Gill, the only children of Joseph Horace Gill, a 
brother of vValter S. Gill, who was the father 
of said Bessie Gill. 
Henry W. Mc-Cance and 
Virginia L. 1\:foCance, the only children of Henry :M. TuicCance, 
who was the only child of Emily Gill McCance, 
the only sister of said Walter S. Gill. The only 
other brother of said Walter S. Gill was Henry 
Gill, who predeceased the said Bessie Gill, un· 
married and without issue. 
2. That the said Bessie Gill was the only child of Walter 
S. Gill and 'Charlotte Baird Gill, both of whom predeceased 
her; that the said .Charlotte Baird Gill had only one sister, 
Margaret Baird Jones, and one brother, James S. Baird, both 
of whom predeceased th_e said Bessie Gill; that· the said 
Walter S. Gill had only one sister, Emily Gill McCance and 
two brothers, Joseph Horace Gill and Henry Gill, all of 
whom predeceased the said Bessie Gill; that the said Emily 
Gill McCance had one child, Henry l\L l\foCance, who pre-
deceased the said Bessie Gill and was survived by onlv two 
children, the def endai1ts, Henry W. McCance ai1d Vii~ginia 
L. McCance; that the said Joseph Horace Gill predeceased 
the said Bessie Gill and was survived by only two children. 
the defendants, ·william P. Gill and Waiter J. Gill; that the 
said Henry Gill predeceased the said Bessie Gill, unmarried 
and without issue. 
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· 3. .Your complainants, therefore, alleg·e · that the said par.:. 
ties named in paragraph 1 of this- bill are the only persons 
who have any right, title and interest in and to the real estate 
of which the said Bessie Gill died seized and possessed. 
* 
(: 
* 
' . 
And at another day, to-wit, on the 9th day of May,. 1940, 
came the defendants, J em1ie B. Knowles. and Henry W. )fo-
. Cance, by counsel, and filed their joint and sepa-
page 4 ~ rate answer, which is, in part, in the following 
words: 
• 
(1) That the allegations contained in paragraph one of 
said bill of complaint are true, according· to the best inf orma-
tion available to these respondents. 
(2) That the allegations contained in paragraph two of 
said bill of complaint. are true according to the best informa-
tion available to these respondents. 
And on the said 9th -day of May; 1940, the defendant, Lot-
tie B. Snead, .by counsel, . :filed in said ·Court her answer to 
said bill, which reads, in part, as fallows: 
• 
This def e1idant f ot answer to said bill, or to so much .thereof 
as she is advised that it is material· and proper · that she 
should answer does answer and say that the allegations madEl 
in said bill are -true· and correct and that she coiictirs iii thEl 
prayer of the complainants and recommend that the :Court 
make sale of the property described in said bill in order to 
effect a partition thereof. 
And at another day, to-wit, on the 28th clay of June, 1940, 
Chas. U. Williams, Jr., Special Commissioner in Chancery, 
filed his report, which is, in part, as f o11ows: 
• 
The third inquiry of. said decree of reference is: "Who 
are the heirs-at-law and distributees of Bessie Gill, deceased, 
and the proportions in which they are entitled to share· in 
the distribution. of said estate, and whether or not :they are 
parties to this suit and properly before the court in this 
cause"; 
Response: The following are the heirs-at-law and distribu-
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tees of Bessie Gill, deceased, and the proportions in which 
they are entitled to -share in the distribution of her estate 
are ·set opposite their respective names. They are all parties 
to this suit and are properly before the court in 
page 5 ~ this cause. 
William P. Gill, 1/6 
Walter J. Gill, 1/6 
Henry W. Mc.Cance, 1/12 
Virginia L. McCance, 1/12 
Jennie B. Knowles, 
Lillie May Baird, 
Lottie B. Snead, 
Kate .B. Williams, 
Daniel W. Baird, 
Marion B. Magee, 
Allie F. Baird, 
1/14 
1/14 
1/14 
. l/14 
1/14 
1/14 
1/14. 
Note : · These proportions are allotted, in my opinion, in ac-
cordance with Sections 5264 and 5266 of the Code of Vir-
ginia. 
* * * 
And at another day, to-wit, on the 6th day of July, 1940, 
came the complainants and the defendant, Lottie B. .Snead, 
and filed their exceptions to the report of said Special ·Com-
missioner in Chancery, which report, excluding the style and 
signatures of counsel, is in the following words: 
EXCEPTION 130 REPORT OF OOMMIS.SJONER. 
The complainants, Kate B. Williams, Allie F. Baird, Daniel 
W. Baird, Marion B. Magee, and Lillie May Baird, and the 
defendant, Lottie B. Snead, except to the report of Charles 
U. Williams, Jr., Special Commissioner in Chancery, filed in 
this cause on the 28th day of June, 1940, insofar as it reports 
on the proportions in which the heirs-at-law and distributees 
of the deceased are entitled to share in the distribution of 
the estate: 
1. Because the report of said Commissioner puts a wrong 
interpretation upon Sections 5264 and 5266 of the Code of 
Virginia, and holds that one-half of the estate goes to thP 
paternal side and the other one-half to the maternal side of 
the deceased' family, whereas, under a proper interpretation 
of the said Sections all of the parties to this cause are en-
titled to share equally in the distribution of the estate, with 
the exception of the McCance children. 
* * * 
And the following is an extract from the depositions re-
. turned with the said Commissioner's report: 
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KATE B. WILLIAMS, 
a witness of lawful age, being first duly sworn, deposes and 
says as f ollofWs : 
page 6 r Q. I hand you herewith the bill of complaint iu 
this suit, and ask that you read the .first and second 
paragraphs and state whether or not the allegations set out 
in these paragraphs are correct as to the relationship of the 
parties to Bessie Gill Y 
A. Yes, they are correct. 
And at another day, to-wit, on the 19th day of August, 1940. 
a decree was entered. in said cause, which reads, in part, as 
follows: 
(DECREE OF AUGUST 19, 1940.) 
This cause came on this 19th day of August, 1940, to be 
again heard upon the papers formerly read and upon the re-
port of Special Commissioner, Charles U. Williams, duly filed 
herein on the 28th day of June, 1940, with depositions at-
tached and upon the exceptions of Kate B. Williams, Allie 
F. Baird, Daniel W. Baird, Marion B. Magee, Lillie May 
Baird and Lottie B. Snead, to said report, which were duly 
filed by leave of court; and was argued by counsel. 
On consideration whereof, and it appearing to the court 
that the said Commissioner has correctly answered the in-
quiries directed by the decree of reference entered in thi~ 
cause, the court doth adjudge, order and decree that the ex-
ceptions of Kate B. Williams, Allie F. Baird, Daniel W. 
Baird, Marion B. Magee, Lillie May Baird, and Lottie B. 
Snead, be and they are hereby overruled and said report ho 
and the same is hereby ratified and confirmed, to which ac-
tion of the court in overruling said exceptions the said par~ 
ties objected and excepted. 
* 
And at another day, to-wit, on the 11th day of Septembe1·, 
1940, the ·Court entered in said cause a. decree. which. in 
part, is in the following words : 
DECREE OONFIRM:LNG SALE. 
On consideration whereof, it appearing from said report 
that K. A. 0 'Connor has made a · written offer of Fifteen 
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Thousand Dollars ($15,000.00) cash for the real es-
page 7 ~ tate described in these proceedings, and the Court 
being of the opinion that the said off er is a good 
one, doth accept the said. offer and doth confirm the sale of 
the said property to K. A. 0 'Connor at the price of $15,000.00 
cash. 
• 
We, the unclersigned, hereby agree that the foregoing copies 
and extracts from the record in the cause of Kate B. Wil-
liams, et als., v. Jennie B. Knowles, et als., constitute a suf-
ficient part of the said record to enable the Supreme Court 
of Appeals to properly decide th~ questions that inay arise 
before it; and we agree that the Clerk may certify the samP-
as the transcript of the said record to be presented to the 
Supreme Court of Appeals by the appellants. 
. . 
GEO. E . .ALLEN, . 
Attorney for Jennie B. Knowles and Henry 
W. Mc Cance, and for Virginia L. McCance, 
who is now an adult. . 
TBiOS. I. TALLEY. . 
Attorney for Kate B. Williams, Allie F. 
Baird, Daniel W. Baird, Marion B. Ma-
gee and Lillie May Baird. . 
DONALD D. WILLIAMS, 
Attorney for Lottie B. Snead. 
I,. Chas .. R. Purdy, Clerk of the Hustings Court, Part II, 
of the City of Richmond, Virginia, do certify that the fore• 
going record ,·vas prepared by counsel; that such parts thereof 
as purport to be copies and extracts from the Court records 
in the .said cause are true copies and extracts therefrom ; and 
I further certify that the notice required by Section 6339 of 
the Code of Virginia, was given before the said transcript was 
made and delivered. 
Given under my hand this 26th day of November, 1940. 
CHAS. R. PURDY, Clerk. 
Fee for record, $3.75. 
A Copy---Teste: 
M. B. WATTS, C. C. 
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